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I. INTRODUCTION
Liberals do not agree on much. There are, however, a few settled
points on which we seem to have reached consensus. One of these is
that racial discrimination is wrong—indeed, one of the paradigm wrongs
liberalism sets out to oppose. Differential treatment based upon
arbitrary categories such as race is a key injustice, and liberals oppose it
at every turn.
Another settled point for liberals is that freedom of association is a
fundamental human right. Just as individuals have the right to speak
their minds in a liberal society, so do they have the right to seek out and
associate with like-minded people. I have the right to allocate my time
and energy to others as I see fit; preventing me from associating with
others, or forcing me into unwanted association, is a key liberal injustice.
* Associate Professor of Public Policy and Philosophy, University of Washington. I
am grateful to the participants at the University of San Diego Conference on the Rights
and Wrongs of Discrimination. Particular thanks go to Dana Nelkin for her insightful
criticisms and suggestions.
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The problem is that these two settled points are in serious tension with
one another. This might not seem apparent on first glance, given the
degree to which liberal theory takes employment discrimination as an
obvious wrong; we seem to accept that, in the context of hiring decisions,
the force of the antidiscrimination principle must limit the associational
rights of the employer. This form of discrimination, however, is not
the only one we might consider. To see more fully how the tension
here might be drawn out, we have only to consider acts of private
discrimination—discrimination by private individuals, acting in roles
generally understood to be outside the realms of the marketplace and
political life. Examples of such discrimination abound: individuals
might form civic associations that discriminate on religious grounds;
they might socialize with individuals from only certain ethnic backgrounds,
or with certain beliefs; they might, indeed, only date or marry
individuals with certain racial identities. In all of these cases, I think we
feel the pull of both principles identified above. Such actions seem both
discriminatory and potentially legitimate examples of free association.
How, for a liberal, can the ultimate moral status of such actions be
determined?
As a way into this question, this Article examines only one case of
private discrimination: the case of discriminatory purchasing decisions.
Imagine an individual who decides to spend her money only at
businesses owned or operated by members of a specific race.1 This is
easily understood as a case of discrimination if, by that term, no moral
conclusions may yet be adduced. We may imagine that individuals of
that particular race have no special skills or knowledge that makes their
goods and services uniquely good. The fact of racial membership is
itself taken as a qualification, a reason to prefer the goods and services of
one party to those of another. The individual in question might simply
feel more comfortable associating with members of one race, and so
chooses to allocate her time and money accordingly.2 There is nothing
fanciful about such a case; indeed, people seem to make such discriminatory
marketplace choices—and similarly discriminatory choices in private
life more generally—on a fairly regular basis.
1. It is important to notice that the race in question need not necessarily be our
own. I might decide to shop only at stores operated by African-Americans, despite not
being African-American myself.
2. There are, for instance, clear cases in which manufacturers attempt to foster
discriminatory shopping. The clothing line FUBU, for instance, appeals to AfricanAmerican identity in its name: For Us, By Us. E.g., Ginia Bellafante, What New Urban
Wear Trend Will Step Off the G Train?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2001, at B8; Josh Sims,
Streets Ahead of the Rest, THE INDEPENDENT (London), July 18, 2002, at 10. The
legitimacy of such appeals, I think, depends upon the legitimacy of discriminatory
shopping in the first place.
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We might ask several distinct moral questions about such actions.
The first set look primarily at the case of individual moral agency. What
is the moral quality of such action? Is it fundamentally immoral to
behave in such an anti-egalitarian manner? If the individual in question
claims to be a liberal, does her action violate her principled beliefs?
Such questions, here, are not our primary concern; they will be asked
only as a means to answering a different, more political set of questions.
Our focus will be on this second set of questions, which begin with
political legitimacy. Here, we ask not simply whether an individual may
be a discriminatory shopper. We ask, instead, whether the liberal state may
legitimately allow marketplace forces to cater to such discriminatory
preferences. Is liberal political philosophy committed to free association
in the marketplace? Or are such discriminatory acts legitimately the
focus of government intervention and coercive force?
The conclusions reached here might help us understand our reactions
to a wide variety of cases of private discrimination. Before we can
understand how we ought to regard such cases generally, we have to
understand what principles might ground our evaluation of such acts.
The principles we develop here, that is, might help us understand cases
as divergent as racial selection in romance and religious exclusion from
civic organizations. But there is also something especially important, I
contend, about discriminatory shopping. In particular, understanding
this phenomenon is necessary for us to gain a full theory of employment
discrimination. The moral permissibility of discriminatory shopping
will affect whether and when employment discrimination is wrong. A
full theory of the latter therefore requires an inquiry into the moral
quality of the former.
This argument proceeds in two parts. Part I attempts to show that
there is something special about discriminatory shopping, such that we
ought to understand it prior to deriving an overall theory of employment
discrimination. Part II then proceeds to analyze the political morality of
discriminatory shopping and offers an account of when and how
liberalism morally prohibits such discrimination. Part III concludes that
such private discrimination is not always contrary to the egalitarian
guarantees of liberalism; while there are some cases in which such
practices run counter to liberalism’s egalitarian guarantees, not all cases
of discriminatory shopping have this quality.
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II. DISCRIMINATION AND ASSOCIATIONAL PREFERENCE: RONALD
DWORKIN AND JACKIE ROBINSON
Before we can answer specific questions about discriminatory shopping,
we have to ask ourselves what discrimination actually is. One starting
point, in this analysis, is to ask what the opposite of discrimination
might be. Here, we might borrow from John Rawls’s principles of
justice. His second principle, which details the conditions under which
inequalities in primary goods such as wealth and income are legitimate,
provides a picture of the nondiscriminatory society.3 Such a society
involves setting up the rules of association such that individuals with
equal talents and motivation can expect equal chances of obtaining
scarce and desirable positions.
So far, so good: this is a plausible picture of a nondiscriminatory
society. Rawls’s principle of fair equality of opportunity demands that
we make whatever changes are necessary to ensure that people are not
disadvantaged illegitimately in their search for scarce positions by
unchosen and arbitrary characteristics. The precise contours of what
these changes would be need not concern us at present. The important
question is more foundational. Just what, in the end, counts as a talent
for a given position? This question may require questioning the legitimacy
of private acts of discrimination—including, most centrally, acts of
discriminatory shopping.
To see this, we may note that there are potentially two forms of
employer discrimination. There are cases in which employers refuse to
hire individuals of a given race or ethnicity for reasons which are
economically irrational. Imagine a case in which an employer refuses to
hire an African-American individual for a given job, despite the fact that
the African-American would be the most efficient and skilled at the job.
The reason for the discrimination may be something like simple racial
animus or hatred; the employer does not act in his own interests in
refusing to hire the individual in question. The employer’s discrimination
undermines his own interests.
We may call this type of employer discrimination irrational discrimination.
It comprises the majority of cases of discrimination; employers who
discriminate often do so based upon false group-based notions of skills
and habits, and thereby restrict the set of individuals they might hire in a
manner contrary to their long-term self-interests.
Not all cases of discrimination, however, have this character.
Employers may refuse to hire individuals of a given race, not because of
animus on the part of the employer, but on the part of potential
3.
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customers. Imagine, here, a case in which an employer refuses to hire
African-American salesmen, not because the employer has any racist
attitudes, but because the potential customers of his business may be
reliably predicted to have discriminatory patterns of shopping.
This form of employment discrimination might be termed rational
discrimination; economic self-interest gives the employer good reason to
engage in this form of discrimination. Alan Wertheimer has termed such
arbitrary characteristics reaction qualifications; they are qualifications
for employment, in that the reactions of potential customers are reliably
related to economically rational objectives.4 An employer who knows
that white skin (or great height, or attractive features) will increase the
ability to sell cars may take this fact into account, and regard the
presence of such a characteristic as a job qualification—a reason to
prefer the one who has the characteristic. The employer can do this,
moreover, without being accused of harboring any racial hatred in his
heart; he is simply doing what the market demands.
Economic rationality, however, is a poor guide to moral behavior. We
may still ask whether the individual who engages in rational discrimination
is acting in a morally acceptable manner. A full theory of discrimination
will require an answer to this question. Our question at present, however, is
the more political: when do liberal political communities have reasons
for interfering with this sort of market interaction? Most of us accept
that there can be cases in which we may legitimately seek to upset
patterns of discrimination, even rational discrimination; demonstrating the
market efficiency of your discrimination will not always prevent regulation.
Employers might, that is, be justly forbidden under some circumstances from
pandering to such illegitimate preferences. But what principles can be
introduced to determine when such regulation is permissible?
We may begin by returning to the idea of fair equality of opportunity
with which we began. Here, scarce and desirable positions ought to be
equally available to all who are similarly motivated and talented. The
notion of talent, however, is deeply underspecific.5 We must first ask:
Does a racial identity conducive to maximizing sales count as a “talent”
for purposes of our principle? There is no simple answer here; we may
well feel different pulls in different cases.
4. Alan Wertheimer, Jobs, Qualifications, and Preferences, 94 ETHICS 99, 100
(1983).
5. For a related analysis, see Iris Marion Young, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF
DIFFERENCE 192-225 (1990).
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To see this, we may examine two distinct cases of discriminatory
shopping. The first of these is derived from Ronald Dworkin in his
analysis of Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265 (1978).6 Allan Bakke sued to be allowed to enter medical school,
arguing that his test scores were higher than those of some AfricanAmerican students who were granted admission.7 His argument was
simply that allocation of such places ought to be done in accordance
with simple merit—merit understood here as a talent for being a
physician: accuracy of diagnostic services, breadth and depth of medical
knowledge, and so on. Dworkin’s rejoinder relies on the legitimacy of
discriminatory shopping. He argues that where African-American
patients prefer African-American doctors, being an African-American
counts as a legitimate talent when it comes to serving the AfricanAmerican community:
There is no combination of abilities and skills and traits that constitutes “merit”
in the abstract; if quick hands count as “merit” in the case of a prospective
surgeon, this is because quick hands will enable him to serve the public better
and for no other reason. If black skin will, as a matter of regrettable fact, enable
another doctor to do a different medical job better, then that black skin is by the
same token “merit” as well.8

Dworkin’s analysis suggests that if African-American patients prefer
African-American doctors, then the medical profession ought to cater to
their desires. We might imagine cases in which this preference is not
retrograde or potentially regrettable; perhaps there are distinct health
conditions endemic to one community which make doctors belonging to
that community more likely to issue correct diagnoses. But Dworkin’s
analysis does not demand that this be so. Imagine, instead, that the
hypothetical preference is simply there, irrational but powerful. Imagine,
that is, that humans from a given group simply prefer to buy products
and services offered by members of that group. Is it morally permissible
for us to cater to these preferences, by taking membership in the group
as a talent for purposes of equality of opportunity? Dworkin’s analysis
suggests that liberalism ought to grant such permission.9

6. RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 289 (1985).
7. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 276-77.
8. DWORKIN supra note 6, at 299.
9. It is not easy to interpret just what Dworkin thinks of such discriminatory
preferences. While he identifies them as “regrettable,” it is not clear that his analysis
requires us to regard such preferences as themselves subject to political condemnation.
If we were to argue that such preferences ought to be altered by political means,
Dworkin’s argument now becomes one appropriate for non-ideal theory; we cater to such
preferences while they exist, while working hard for a world in which they do not. I am
grateful to Dana Nelkin and David Brink for discussion of this point.
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The second case we will consider, however, gives us reason to resist
the conclusion Dworkin offers. In 1947, Jackie Robinson accompanied
the Brooklyn Dodgers to play an exhibition game in Jacksonville,
Florida. The Jacksonville Parks Commission voted to cancel the game
rather than allow Robinson to play. Robinson and the Dodgers continued to
barnstorm throughout Florida, in the face of frequent and virulent
opposition. In the face of such pressure for integration, the Jacksonville
Beach Chamber of Commerce voted in 1953 to officially ban integrated
baseball within the confines of the city. An explanation for this vote was
given by the spokesman for the City Council in terms appealing to the
rationality of discrimination in the face of discriminatory shopping
patterns: “[n]o race prejudice is involved,” went the spokesman’s
statement. “It’s just that the patrons of the team felt they would rather
have an all-white team.”10 This argument, it should be clear, appeals to
the legitimacy of the discriminatory shopping patterns of the baseball
patrons of Jacksonville Beach. If these patrons prefer their baseball to
be provided by white players, then whiteness is a reaction qualification.
White skin counts as baseball talent—just as black skin might count as
medical talent on the analysis offered by Dworkin.
The difficulty, of course, is that the two cases seem to most of us quite
distinct. Segregated baseball is understood by most of us as a legacy of
both slavery and Jim Crow. The integration of baseball by Jackie Robinson
changed both baseball and America for the better. These conclusions
seem to stand regardless of the factual truth of the spokesman’s
statement. Even if the baseball patrons preferred white players, they
should not have had such preferences. Segregating owners, more to the
point, should not have had a right to discrimination in employment, even
when such discrimination would lead to more people’s preferences being
satisfied. Sometimes, we think the preferences are so malign that we
expect people to change them; and we expect business owners to suffer
some financial distress rather than cater to such preferences. Even if
segregated baseball maximized profits, integration was required by liberal
principles.
Our conclusions are not quite so settled in the case imagined by
Dworkin. One response is simply to treat this case as equivalent to that
of segregated baseball, and regard both sets of preferences as similarly
retrograde. This response is inadequate; the two cases are distinct, and
10.

HANK AARON & LONNIE WHEELER, I HAD A HAMMER 50-51 (1991).
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ought to be treated as such. The task, of course, is figuring out how they
are distinct. Divergent reactions to the two cases should lead us to
believe that discriminatory shopping is neither always forbidden nor
always permissible. We need a theory that helps us distinguish the two
cases, by telling us what makes a given case of discriminatory shopping
permissible. This theory may enable us to make some headway in
determining when an employer may legitimately cater to such preferences
in hiring decisions.
III. ANTIDISCRIMINATION AND EQUALITY: TWO VARIETIES
OF LIBERAL EGALITARIANISM
We might understand liberal equality in two ways. First, we might
think of liberalism as a theory in which all arbitrary forms of advantage
are to be eliminated. On this account, equality of something—in whatever
currency or metric it is to be understood—is taken to be a liberal value
directly expressing our equal respect for persons. Take, as an example, a
simple egalitarian theory like equality of welfare. If we find that one
individual has very high welfare, and the other individual quite low
welfare, and that the only difference between them is an arbitrary
accident of birth, then we have at the very least a prima facie reason for
redistributing goods. In this example, equality of welfare expresses our
equal respect for persons; in principle, no area of human welfare is off
limits from liberal political attentions.11 We may call such theories
broad theories of distributive equality, in that considerations of distributive
justice are not derived from mediated notions like the demands of
political life; they result from demands morally relevant at the
foundational level of interpersonal behavior.
The alternative approach, in contrast, makes the link between the
equality of persons and more specific notions of distributive justice in a
mediated way. We may call such theories narrow accounts of distributive
justice. Such an account does not take distributive equality itself to be
morally important; it only becomes morally important under certain
circumstances and for certain reasons. Rawls’s theory of justice provides a
key example of such a narrow theory; it does not purport to range over
the entire scope of human behavior, but only over the basic structure of
society.12 It is thus a distinctively political theory, rather than on a
11. See Elizabeth Anderson, What is the Point of Equality?, 109 ETHICS 287
(1999) (discussing ways in which this demand can seem misguided).
12. See generally Michael Blake, Distributive Justice, State Coercion, and
Autonomy, 30 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 257, 257-96 (2001) (discussing reasons for Rawls’s
decisions). Rawls’s decision to limit his focus in this way is criticized in G. A. COHEN,
IF YOU’RE AN EGALITARIAN, HOW COME YOU’RE SO RICH? 117-33 (2000).
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broader form of moral concern. For Rawls, equality of primary goods is
never itself morally valuable; the egalitarian guarantees of the difference
principle do not emerge directly out of equal concern and respect, but
only once Rawls has demonstrated that such egalitarian guarantees are
necessary for political legitimacy.13 More generally, a narrow theory
such as Rawls’s does not take any specific inequality—whether of
goods, resources, or welfare—as itself indicating a moral problem. The
inequality only becomes relevant for liberal political morality when it
can be demonstrated that such inequality violates the equality of persons
conceived of as free and equal citizens. What is important, on this
account, is how much of life is left outside the public sphere. Rawls
applies his theory neither to churches, nor universities, nor private
relationships—except insofar as these institutions undermine such
political guarantees as the fair value of the political liberties. Isolated
from such political effects, the inequalities engendered by such institutions
are no concern for such an indirect theory of liberal equality.
Here, private discrimination such as discriminatory shopping will not
in itself be constrained by liberal principle. Liberalism’s principles may
still condemn such acts, but only when we can demonstrate that these
acts relate to the political standing of persons. Discriminatory shopping
must now be understood in virtue of its effects upon political relationships,
rather than other, more direct notions of the equality of persons.
It is worth noting that the distinction between broad and narrow theory
does not mirror the distinction between comprehensive and political
liberalism. Political liberalism has two aspects: a restricted domain of
application, and a particular epistemic status for the political principles it
endorses. Rawls’s earlier, comprehensive liberalism, in contrast, had a
restricted domain of application—Rawls did not, for instance, apply his
full theory globally, nor to private associations—but did not have the
epistemic properties he would develop later with Political Liberalism.
Rawls’s later theory represents a narrow form of liberal equality in that it
focuses attention on the political domain; so, however, does Rawls’s
early theory in that its domain of applicability is the basic structure of
society, from which Rawls excludes a great many private institutions
and associations. Rawls’s political liberalism is taken as a key example
of a narrow theory later in this Article; it is worth emphasizing, however,
13. This concern is emphasized in JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 137
(1993), but it is present in Rawls’s earlier work as well. See RAWLS, supra note 3, at 7-8.
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that Rawls’s earlier comprehensive liberalism might have just as easily
served this role.14
The direct view of liberalism might be well exemplified by John
Stuart Mill’s vision of the tolerant society in On Liberty. Mill’s
liberalism demands that individuals ought to foster and tolerate a wide
variety of opinions and forms of life. Mill’s complex idea of the human
good leads directly to distributive conclusions; we are to do what is
needed to develop the potential within all human beings. This view,
however, does not have any exclusive relationship to the coercive power
of the state; it looks, instead, towards the legitimacy of both political and
social coercion. We are supposed to achieve this outcome both through
our roles as political agents and as private moral agents. Liberalism, on
this analysis, directly constrains acts of private discrimination by issuing
commands prohibiting people from seeking to coercively cause others to
conform to a dominant social way of life. Mill even goes so far as to
prohibit such forms of private discrimination as the ostentatious shunning of
those we regard as repugnant. We can, Mill famously notes, avoid the
company of those we find disgusting, but cannot—upon pain of
illiberalism—“parade” our avoidance.15
The difficulty of distinguishing between avoidance and shunning
indicates the tension between the two liberal ideas with which we began.
Mill’s liberalism includes both a strong right to free association, and yet
constrains behavior such that this freedom cannot be used to cause other
individuals to conform. There is some evidence here that Mill’s liberalism
may have some difficulties adjudicating the moral nature of private
discrimination. While other broad theories of equality will be more or
less demanding than Mill’s, they all regard personal habits of discrimination
as potentially within the purview of liberalism in their own rights, rather
than in virtue of their effect upon political relationships. This may make
it difficult for a broad theory of liberal equality to give us convincing
answers to the questions we now ask. This is not to say it is impossible;
a broad liberalism might be developed which can adequately account for
the differences between segregated baseball and discriminatory medical
preferences. But a standing difficulty here will always follow the
application of liberalism’s egalitarian guarantees to the private realm. On
the broad view, liberalism’s egalitarian guarantees directly constrain our
14. The discussion below on two ways of condemning discriminatory shopping
depends upon adopting political liberalism; the main point, however—that indirect
liberals can refuse to condemn discrimination except insofar as it leads to political
exclusion—can easily be accommodated within a comprehensive liberalism such as
Rawls’s.
15. See generally JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 94 (Currin V. Shields ed.,
1977) (1859).
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ability to make private decisions, demanding that such decisions do not
violate the specific forms of distributive equality they endorse.16 Such
an extension is unwarranted: there can be some cases of private
discrimination that are at the very least morally permissible.
To see this, imagine a truly idiosyncratic form of discriminatory
shopping: I decide to shop only at stores owned by red-headed men. The
blonde store owner across the way faces a significant drop in his sales as
a result of my newfound fetish. My decision may be irrational, but I do
not think it can be called unjust.17 A broad liberalism might be
developed which will agree with this outcome, but there is a standing
pressure within such a liberalism to test such decisions against liberal
equality. As such, a broad liberalism is likely to regard such forms of
private discrimination as—to at least a small degree—unjust. After all, I
have done something to the blonde storekeeper; I have lowered his
economic holdings, or his welfare, or some other metric of egalitarian
concern, and I have done that based upon an arbitrary characteristic. He
did not choose to be blonde, and yet this unchosen characteristic has led
to a reduction in his expectations. If the point of liberal equality is the
equalization of some good thing, then the fact that I have reduced his
stock of that thing should matter morally, and therefore, matter for
political morality.
But why should I have to explain my decisions to the set of blondehaired storekeepers? None of those individuals had any claim to my
business; there is no individual or set of individuals I seem to have
wronged by my actions. If liberalism extends over the private realm in
the manner described, it seems to demand the justifications in all realms
of life. It seems, however, that some forms of relationship ought not
require any justification through liberal norms. If I want to shop only at
16. A simple hedonic utilitarianism such as Bentham’s, for instance, might make
all individual behavior—including such private behavior as marital choices—subject to
political criticism and control, based upon an overall accounting of social utility. See,
e.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 2-4 (Prometheus
Books 1988) (1822). Later utilitarians such as Mill would not, but can only reject such
conclusions by looking at contingent considerations such as the disutility associated with
such violations of privacy. They cannot do what narrow theories do, which is to simply
regard such decisions as outside the realm of political life.
17. Similarly, thin fashion models would have no legitimate political complaint if
consumer preferences shifted to demand fatter models in magazine ads. Such thin
models would be disadvantaged, and disadvantaged for what are probably arbitrary
reasons, but the indirect model does not regard this as always a matter for political
concern. Thanks to Matt Zwolinski for this example.
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stores owned by redheads, it does not seem to me that anyone has even a
pro tanto right to complain about my action.
This is not intended to definitively disprove the broad vision of liberal
equality; such an ambition is beyond the purview of this paper. The only
suggestion here is that such a liberalism may tend to extend its reach in
an unprofitable direction. If we can develop an alternative approach able
to more directly capture our intuitions about cases of discriminatory
shopping, we may thereby derive a plausible and attractive theory. This
Article argues for a narrow vision indirectly, by showing how such a
narrow vision can provide us plausible answers while avoiding the
pitfalls described above.
A liberalism focusing upon the demands of political legitimacy is
likely to be able to give us what we need. We should therefore see
whether such a liberalism gives us convincing answers in the cases
under consideration. A good example for our analysis might be Rawls’s
own political liberalism. This theory is one of the most well-developed
forms of indirect theorizing yet produced; it provides us with some
ability to determine whether or not an indirect theory is able to aid us in
our task.
We might therefore begin by clarifying what makes Rawls’s political
liberalism deserve the name political. It is political, argues Rawls, in
that it is a moral conception that does not try to cover the entire set of
acts and relationships constituting human life. It is instead a moral
conception worked out for only one specific subject, that of the political,
understood by Rawls as the constitutional system and matters of basic
justice.18 When we argue about these matters, contends Rawls, we ought
to argue based upon a restricted conception of justice appropriate for
only this site of justice. In this, we do not reference our own comprehensive
theories, on which we can expect to disagree with one another; Rawls’s
contention is that we can expect a diversity of comprehensive doctrines
in any free and democratic society. But such agreement is not necessary
for a functioning and just society, so long as justice is understood in the
political terms Rawls recommends. What matters is that we arrive at
principles whose fulfillment gives us reason to regard the political
system we inhabit as legitimate. Distributive equality—say, the difference
principle—may be an outcome of this process. But distributive equality
itself has no claim upon us; we seek political legitimacy, and distributive
equality is at best a means to that valuable end.

18. See generally RAWLS, supra note 13, at 3-11; see also John Rawls, The
Domain of the Political and Overlapping Consensus, in COLLECTED PAPERS 473, 491
(Samuel Freeman ed., Harv. Univ. Press 1999).
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This is, of course, only a caricature of Rawls’s political liberalism.
But it allows us to proceed with our analysis. We might begin by noting
that the moral analysis of discriminatory shopping now takes a more
complex form than it would under the broad view of liberal equality. In
particular, condemning discriminatory shopping might now take one of
two distinct forms. We might mean, in the first instance, that one or
more particular comprehensive moral theories prohibit discriminatory
shopping. These moral theories, we should emphasize, should not be
understood as having any secondary or diminished claim to truth;
political liberalism is not relativism. Adherents of a given doctrine are
not called upon to regard their own doctrine as anything less than the
final truth in matters of morality. Political liberalism instead demands
that when we reason together about constitutional essentials and matters
of basic justice, we refer only to the restricted set of political reasons we
can be expected to share. But this does not restrain us from relying upon
our own comprehensive doctrines in making moral evaluations in sites
other than the public form of deliberation.
When we condemn a given case of discriminatory shopping, then, we
might mean one of two things. We might mean that such discrimination
is wrong in accordance with our own comprehensive doctrine; or, we
might mean that such discrimination is wrong according to the public
standards of justice we share. These two forms of analysis have
considerably different normative force when applied in the public realm
as justifying coercive government interference.
To see this, imagine a circumstance in which adherents of a given
comprehensive doctrine—say, a particular vision of Christianity—argue
over the moral quality of their right to private discrimination. Nothing
in Rawls’s political liberalism suggests that their moral discussions need
make reference to any public standards of political justice; Rawls’s
inclusionary project insists that such discussions ought to take place, and
any theory precluding them is illiberal in a fundamental way. Thus,
Christians may discuss whether or not given practices of exclusion
comport with the fundamental values of Christianity. We might, on this
vision, ask one another whether or not a refusal to shop with non-Christians
is itself wrong—where wrongness is regarded, in this example, as a
violation of Christian teaching.
We might also, of course, discuss with one another whether such a
refusal is wrong in a way that we can expect to motivate both Christians
and non-Christians. Such an analysis, for Rawls, must refer to those
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standards of justice we could establish as a public conception of justice
for a liberal democracy. This conception of justice will refer to the demands
of equality within the public sphere. While it is too much to expect
unanimity on a comprehensive account of morality, it is reasonable to
expect agreement on a public standard for disagreements within the public
realm. Such a public conception will refer to the specifically political
demands of egalitarianism; in particular, it will mandate equal standing
within the political system of constitutional democracy. However much
we may disagree in private about matters of fundamental morality, we
are obligated to do whatever is necessary to have a public sphere in
which people are able to act and speak as equals.
This gives us our first entry into the political morality of private
discrimination. First, note that we may regard acts of private discrimination,
including acts of discriminatory shopping, as morally permitted or
prohibited according to our own comprehensive doctrines. In public
deliberation, however, we must refer to a restricted set of reasons we can
expect to motivate those who disagree with our comprehensive theories.
The appropriate question to ask in such a public forum is not whether
this act of discriminatory shopping is morally wrong. Rather, the appropriate
question is whether this act of discriminatory shopping is likely to
undermine the public political equality of our society.
There are at least two ways in which an act of discriminatory shopping
might undermine public political equality, and therefore two ways in
which we might understand such an act as illegitimate according to
political liberalism’s lights. The first of these deals with the issue of
public shame and stigmatization.19 There can be cases in which our refusal
sends a message of social inferiority and internalized shame. Imagine,
in this context, a refusal to eat food that has been handled by a certain
social group. The members of the group in question may understand this
practice of refusal as a humiliating denial of full membership in the
society. No full theory can predict in advance when this might be so; the
cases will vary enormously based upon quite subtle distinctions. But
there can be some cases in which it is reasonable to imagine that the
members of a given group will regard their standing within the public
sphere as diminished by the message of inferiority this form of
discriminatory shopping might send.20
19. For the notion of stigma, see ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA 3 (First Touchstone
ed. 1986).
20. What will count as such a message will have to refer to the social meanings
implicit in a particular culture. It is not enough that I find a given message stigmatizing;
it must be shown that I am right, given the social network of meanings comprehensible
to those speaking and listening, to find the message stigmatizing. If I find your refusal to
touch your cap upon my approach socially stigmatizing and alienating, that does not give
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This contradiction of the demands of a narrow liberalism focused on
political life might be seen through reference to the requirements of
democratic participation. One of the key prerequisites for acting as a
political agent, it seems, is having a conception of oneself as worthy to
engage in such action. On this point, Amartya Sen’s analysis of the
ability to show one’s face in public without shame is instructive; social
shame, on his capabilities approach, undermines a wide variety of
human goods and relationships, including the specifically political
relationships of democratic justice.21 Rawls’s own idea that the social
bases of self-respect form a primary good in their own right reinforces
this idea. That is, when discriminatory shopping sends a message of
social inferiority and stigmatization, political liberalism prohibits that act
of private discrimination.
This first way of examining discriminatory shopping gets us some
purchase on the differences between permissible and impermissible
forms of private discrimination. We may, however, also look to a second
means for understanding these differences. In some cases, acts of
private discrimination exacerbate and amplify relationships of injustice.
When this is so, the acts of private discrimination lose their status as
morally permissible, and become illegitimate according to the principles
of political liberalism.
This provides some potential leverage to justify the coercive political
interference with such private patterns. Even if it can be demonstrated
that many individuals in a given community prefer to buy their cars from
white men, we might legitimately seek to interfere in acts of rational
discrimination against black men in hiring for jobs as car salesmen. The
refusal to buy cars from such men contributes to, and likely stems from,
black men’s status as economically and politically marginal members of
society. Any given car purchase has a negligible effect upon the continued
legacy of race hatred and exclusion. Taken as a pattern, such discriminatory
forms of shopping help maintain the social marginalization of black males.
This marginalization makes the participation of black men in public life
more difficult, in a host of ways large and small. Political interference
in the process thus seems at least potentially permissible on a narrow
theory such as Rawls’s political liberalism.
us a reason to compel you to touch your cap; rather, given the context, I ought to
overcome my feelings and learn to live with your apparent lack of respect. These
matters are complex, and I can only touch their surfaces in the present context.
21. AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED 115-16 (1992).
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We might also arrive at these conclusions through the earlier distinction
between rational and irrational forms of discrimination. There can be
cases in which an act of rational discrimination by a supplier of goods—
one which, that is, tracks the shopping preferences of consumers—
simply has no bearing on the public status of group members. Imagine,
in this context, that enough people enjoy shopping with red-haired men
that it becomes rational for an employer to regard red hair as a talent for
the job of salesman. We may note, here, that there is no preexisting way
in which people without red hair are socially disadvantaged as a group.
They are not subject to frequent and persistent economic underdevelopment;
they do not have a history of social exclusion; they do not, as a group,
suffer a disproportionate amount of exclusion and discrimination in
education. On this account, while the arbitrary nature of the red-haired
man’s increased job chances may bother a blonde man, there is no sense
in which this act of rational discrimination represents a wrong to the
blonde man. Put simply, there is no history of irrational discrimination
making this act of rational discrimination morally impermissible.22
Many other cases, however, will not have these rosy contours.
Rational discrimination often occurs when consumers prefer a world in
which the political and economic exclusion of a given group of people
continues. The example of Jackie Robinson is instructive. The preferences
of white baseball patrons for white players were not formed in a vacuum;
they reflected—consciously or unconsciously—a preference for a world in
which white and black were separate and unequal. These preferences,
when put in place, gave symbolic emphasis to the inferior status of
African-Americans in the South. A refusal to allow integrated baseball had
a social message, and a social effect, of political inequality. The case of
Brown v. Board of Education, after all, noted that the constitutional
wrong of separate but “equal” educational facilities was an ingrained
message of black inferiority. A similar analysis might well be provided
for segregated baseball. Even if the spokesman for the Jacksonville
Beach council was being honest, and the discrimination proposed was
rational, the discriminatory shopping preferences were politically malign
in their effects; neither the consumers nor the producers of baseball, on
22. It is, of course, always possible that such a pattern of actions may eventually
produce the social and political marginalization of blonde-headed men. If this is so, then
acts of private discrimination against the blonde-headed now become illegitimate from
the political point of view—and potentially subject to political control. I emphasize,
here, some historically significant categories such as race, gender, and sexual orientation,
but only because these represent clear and powerful forms of social marginalization; they
are not the only forms of marginalization we might imagine. A history of exclusion is
likely to be found in most actual cases of marginalization, but there is nothing conceptually
necessary about such an historical process. I am grateful to David Brink for pressing me
to be clearer on this point.
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the principles of political liberalism, had a right to have their preferences
for segregated baseball respected. These preferences were for a world in
which social marginalization was a fact of life, and to respect such
preferences violates the political guarantees of a narrow liberal theory.
Our principle, then, might be as follows: for a narrow theory of liberal
equality such as Rawls’s political liberalism, we are permitted to engage
in acts of private discrimination so long as such acts do not exacerbate or
contribute to a pattern of social marginalization leading to political
exclusion and injustice. We are allowed, for example, to seek out our
barbers based upon any number of arbitrary characteristics—their hair
color, their linguistic capacity, their height—so long as our choice of
characteristic does not contribute to the process that excludes individuals
with such characteristics from those goods needed for full citizenship in
a legitimate state.23
This principle gives us the right answer in the cases we have so far
discussed. White doctors do not have significant worries over their
status as political equals; accordingly, preferences for black physicians
may be legitimately catered to by markets in liberal societies. AfricanAmericans in the southern United States in 1947, in contrast, were
marginalized in a particularly extreme manner; the preference for white
ballplayers continued a social process of exclusion by sending a
message of separation, inferiority, and stigma. The integration of baseball
was not only compatible with liberal equality, but demanded by it.
This means, however, that the burden of proof rests to some degree on
the person insisting that a given act of private discrimination is unjust.
A case of private discrimination is not, in itself, necessarily contrary to
liberal principles of justice. Only when we demonstrate that a given
case of discrimination contributes to an existing political injustice may
we condemn that case of discrimination from the standpoint of political
liberalism. The African-American preference for African-American
23. Harriet Baber has criticized this position with reference to a male who applies
for a traditionally female job and is rejected for his gender. If a man applies to be a
secretary and is refused because being female is taken by employers as a reaction
qualification, is he not treated unjustly? The answer, I think, is no—so long as men do
not face so much difficulty in finding paid employment that it is legitimate to regard
them as members of a marginalized social group. This is, I think, unlikely to be the case.
Until men face such difficulty in finding employment that they are legitimately so
regarded, I believe the example of such a man is best understood as analogous to the
blond-haired storekeeper’s reduced wages described above—regrettable, perhaps, but not
a matter of liberal political concern.
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doctors may be a case in point. We might condemn this preference from
one or more comprehensive doctrines; it may be un-Christian, perhaps,
or contrary to the demands of a Millian liberalism. But from the
standpoint of political liberalism, it hardly seems possible for us to
regard this as unjust. There is no standing political or economic exclusion
for white physicians in the United States. That they might be, to some
degree, excluded from the African-American market is perhaps unwelcome;
it is hard to see this as a case of injustice. Whether or not the preference
for African-American doctors is grounded in any reasonable set of
beliefs, it does not exacerbate any existing social process of exclusion.
A political liberalism, then, can distinguish between the case of the
African-American baseball player and the white physician, by noting the
divergent political circumstances faced by these two representative
individuals. In sum, not all cases of private discrimination have the
same moral quality for a theorist of political liberalism.
IV. CONCLUSION
Two points warrant attention in closing. First, this Article suggests
modest conclusions. The approach given here is not the only solution to
the moral evaluation of private discrimination generally. Divergent
cases of private discrimination may have different moral elements;
similarly, a comprehensive liberalism might be described to deal with
the cases discussed here in a productive way. I aim only to show that
narrow liberalism is able to give us attractive and plausible answers to
such cases. Rawls’s political liberalism provides a theory that is, at the
very least, a profitable avenue for future inquiry in this area.
The second notable point is an irony about what this Article presents.
The analysis given suggests that private discrimination such as discriminatory
shopping is generally permissible, except when it exacerbates an existing
social injustice. This means, in the end, that we are largely free to
discriminate, except when such discrimination contributes to a pattern of
social exclusion comprehensible as such on an indirect theory such as
political liberalism. The analysis suggests that, in the end, even racial
preferences in private association might be morally permissible—except,
of course, when such preferences contribute to the maintenance of
preexisting forms of racial hierarchy. The irony is that even private
cases of racial discrimination might be permissible in many cases, were
it not for the history of public racial exclusion and domination found
throughout much of our history. In the end, private discrimination might
have been more legitimate in a world without racial hierarchy; we might
well have been able to discriminate to our heart’s content, if it were not
for all the racists.
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